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Opens on February 4th, 2026 Novaya Gazeta Europe With the following article a window into Russia.
Novaya Gazeta Europe evaluated more than five million posts from nearly a hundred Russian pro-Kremlin channels on Telegram. The aim of this analysis: to trace how hostility towards the political opposition, migrants and people with so-called “non-traditional values” has developed in Russia.
The content published between 2019 and 2024 shows a strikingly consistent pattern: hate speech regularly increases in the run-up to repressive legal initiatives, reaches its peak in phases of political uncertainty and is primarily directed against groups that have the most difficulty defending themselves.
You can read all of the medium’s research in English here.
Homophobia as a weapon
Already in 2019, Russia experienced a new wave of oppression against LGBT people. In Chechnya, human rights organizations again documented mass arrests, torture and honor killings. In Moscow, the LGBT film festival “Side by Side” took place for the last time, accompanied by attacks by right-wing extremist groups that operated with the tacit approval of the authorities. That same year, sportswear brand Reebok was forced to withdraw a feminist advertising campaign after a coordinated backlash.
In 2019, 46 percent of posts related to LGBT people or women’s rights were negative. By 2022, this share had increased to 65 percent.
When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, coverage of LGBT issues briefly fell behind, overshadowed by the media’s fixation on Ukraine. Despite this, the proportion of negative posts about LGBT people reached an all-time high of 72 percent in the first half of the year.
Just weeks later, lawmakers began discussing a bill to completely ban so-called “LGBT propaganda.” While pro-government media continues to portray the West as a place “conquered by perverts,” their language toward LGBT people within Russia has become significantly harsher — and increasingly explicit.
Migrants as a political target
In September 2021, a murder in the Moscow region marked a turning point. In the village of Buzhaninovo, two people from Tajikistan raped and killed a local pensioner. News of the crime sparked spontaneous protests from residents, who called for all migrants to be expelled from a nearby workers’ dormitory. The authorities complied with this request within a day – although it later emerged that the perpetrators of the crime had never lived there.
This case was one of dozens involving migrants that dominated federal headlines in the late summer and fall of 2021. Crimes committed by “non-Slavs” received disproportionate attention. While Russian citizens were increasingly portrayed as victims – not just in their own country, but throughout the former Soviet region.
As a result, the proportion of negative reporting about migrants increased. One in three mentions of migrants or ethnic minorities had a negative tone.
According to a joint investigation by independent media outlets iStories and Novaya Gazeta, migrants commit around half as many crimes as Russian citizens.
Police raids against migrants nevertheless became routine, including operations at mosques where worshipers were forced to lie face down while their documents were checked, sometimes even during prayer.
Normalization of oppression
After the invasion of Ukraine, the “internal enemy” category was expanded. Alexei Navalny’s supporters were replaced by “traitors” – Russians who were accused of siding with Ukraine and the West. In spring 2022, one in five posts about the opposition contained accusations of betrayal, dehumanization or endorsement of repression.
Today, between 50 and 70 percent of all posts about the opposition describe arrests, trials or other forms of punishment. Political scientist Jekaterina Schulmann argues that this visibility is intentional: “If you (as State, Anm. d. Ed.) “If we cannot rely on popular support, repression must be demonstrated as publicly as possible.”
Invented enemies
The mobilization of hate is a well-known feature of authoritarian systems. According to political scientist Ilya Matveyev, it has become indispensable to the Russian political model. “Everything is based on hate,” he says. “Support is generated by the image of a common enemy.”
The long-term consequences can be serious. Schulmann warns that the war has normalized violence and collective aggression. “Large numbers of people have learned how to use weapons and engaged in organized violence. Where will this energy go when the war is over?”One of the most likely scenarios, she warns, is a deterioration in the functioning of the political system, accompanied by brutalization: a fragmentation in which violence becomes habitual at localized levels and increasingly escapes formal political control.
However, there is reason for cautious optimism. Propagandistic narratives often do not take root deeply. Matveyev argues that tolerance continues to grow in Russia’s major cities, but needs to be constantly suppressed. “Homophobia is not a natural state,” he says. “It needs to be constantly reinforced.”
The same logic applies to migrants. If state-sponsored hostility disappears, says human rights lawyer Valentina Chupik, attitudes will quickly change. “Without propaganda, people stop hating.”
You can also listen to the podcast “Free Speech” from the taz Panter Foundation. He deals with Russian imperialism, its past, present and responsibility. The focus of the conversation is the recurring impunity of state violence in Russia and its historical and current consequences.
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