D The Coalition of the Willing recently met in Paris Security guarantees for Ukraine formulated. A multinational force is supposed to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine. This offer is dangerous for three reasons. Russia will not be deterred by a peacekeeping force that is too small. The Paris Declaration makes a war between NATO and Russia more conceivable. And it reduces the pressure on Europe to provide Ukraine with more military support.
The problem is not that Putin does not agree to the stationing of troops from NATO countries. The problem would be if he agreed. He could make a deal with US President Donald Trump and set up a trap: luring too small a force into Ukraine. The KGB’s bag of tricks offers many opportunities to present the presence of the enemy on one’s own doorstep to the Russian public as a clever move of their own.
It would be very likely that Putin would then test the troops militarily. The Kremlin revisionism does not allow a sovereign Ukraine, and the force would be too small to deter. France and Great Britain cannot form a significant part of a large, robust force with about 150,000 soldiers place. The British Army has shrunk to around 70,000 soldiers lowest level in 200 years. A small force can shoot back in the event of Russian attacks, but cannot seek a decision from the battle, i.e. destroy attacking units.
Even if tens of thousands of Western soldiers, along with ammunition and material, were to fall from the sky, deterrence would not be guaranteed. Ultimately, Russia believes that it has escalation dominance through nuclear threats and a lack of unity among Western states. Attacks on our own soldiers would present Western troop contributors with a dilemma. They could either respond militarily, likely triggering a war between NATO states and Russia. Or they could not respond militarily, thereby abandoning Ukraine and questioning the credibility and continued existence of NATO.
War between Russia and NATO more likely
The Paris Declaration has another consequence: it makes a war between Russia and NATO states more conceivable. The coalition of the willing is threatening to use military means in the event of Russian attacks. This is a breach of taboo: Until now, this threat was limited to attacking NATO territory. This means that a red line in Ukraine policy to date is disappearing: there must be no war between Russia and NATO.
In previous operations, politicians and military officials tried to keep this risk to zero. This is how NATO avoided a confrontation when Russian paratroopers suddenly arrived in 1999 occupied the airport in Kosovo. In Syria, US and Russian military officials coordinated to… unwanted escalation to avoid. The Paris Declaration, on the other hand, focuses on deterrence and not de-escalation.
The explanation is questionable for a third reason. It reduces the pressure on Europe to work on the only sustainable security guarantee: the sufficient military capability of Ukraine. As long as the Kremlin remains revisionist, Ukraine will have to defend itself. So that at some point it no longer has to fight like it does now, it must be able to deter Russia itself.
Armament and sanctions
The Paris promise creates false hope that Western countries can provide this deterrent. It needs that Porcupine: European states should arm Ukraine more quickly and comprehensively, even if it is expensive and unpopular. A highly armed Ukraine, combined with even tougher Western sanctions, can change the Kremlin’s calculation to achieve more by continuing to fight than by negotiating.
Given these risks, the question arises as to why France President Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer have rushed forward. The Paris Declaration is above all a political symbol, born of Europe’s need. On the one hand, it’s about appeasement of the USA. Trump wants quick success, and Europe must respond to US action. If Europe insists that the conditions for a stable peace are not present, they would give the MAGAs an excuse to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine (even if the Europeans pay for them, as they already do), or to make a deal with Putin that completely ignores Europe.
Another addressee of Paris is Putin. Europe signals that it is not one way Minsk 2.0 agreement to let in. A main problem of the OSCE special observation mission from 2014 to 2022 was that it was unable to make public who – mostly Russia – was violating the ceasefire. The Paris Declaration envisages a commission that identifies responsibility.
There is a third addressee: Ukraine. Europeans signaled in Paris that they would not leave Ukraine alone. Ukrainian soldiers need such signals to keep fighting. The civilian population needs them to hold on, under rocket and drone terror and without electricity in the Ukrainian winter.
But even if it is “only” about symbolic politics: It is dangerous to let three genies out of the same bottle: the ideas that deterrence works with a small number of forces, that a war against Russia is possible and that there are cheap alternatives to long-term, massive rearmament in Ukraine.
Given these risks, it is good that the federal government is keeping a low profile when it comes to the involvement of the Bundeswehr. The fact that Merz cannot completely refuse to participate is due to Europe’s self-inflicted dependence on the USA, which has turned against Europe.