At least 5,000 dead, possibly as many as 18,000. When on January 8th and 9th there was a critical mass of people for the first time – Observers assume 5 million – took to the streets all over Iran at the same time, the rulers of the Islamic Republic apparently saw no other way out than that To smother the uprising with a massacre of historic proportions.
The Revolutionary Guards played a central role in coordinating the mass killings of their own people – as well as in suppressing previous waves of protests. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the paramilitary force was founded by then revolutionary leader Ruhollah Khomeini with a clear goal. It should defend the new system of rule and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution against external and internal enemies.
Above all, they were supposed to keep the regular army (Artesh) in check, because it was loyal to the Shah until the revolution. The new clerical leadership feared the possibility of a coup and therefore strengthened the paramilitaries.
And 47 years after the Islamic Revolution, the Revolutionary Guards are not only a military but also an economic superpower, a kind of state within a state – and they would have everything to lose if the regime were toppled. Only when you understand how far this influence extends and how fragile it is at the same time do you understand their willingness to engage in almost limitless brutality.
Everyone knows what is meant by “Sepah”.
On a trip through Iran in 2018 – US President Donald Trump had just withdrawn from the nuclear deal – a friend, then an economics student, offered me a very special tour. We were driving through Tehran and she said, “Now I’ll show you everything in this city that belongs to the Revolutionary Guards.”
Their full name is Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami – the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. But the Iranians themselves simply call them “Sepah,” the army. Everyone knows who is meant. That already indicates who is actually in charge in Iran.
It was a long tour. On every street corner there was something the Tehran student could point to: banks, restaurant chains, construction companies, energy companies, airlines. We stopped at one of the chain restaurants and she unlocked her cell phone at the table. The tour continued. Even among the apps in her phone, a good portion belonged to holdings close to the Revolutionary Guards.
Also the national landline network Iranian internet provider and two cell phone companies are under their control. The network that the Revolutionary Guards have stretched through all areas of the Iranian economy and society is confusing and omnipresent.
The Revolutionary Guards and the “Axis of Resistance”
Iran’s foreign policy is also dominated by the Revolutionary Guards. The long arm of the Revolutionary Guard has shaped the Middle East for decades. Among other things, they are responsible for the Quds Force. An elite unit that arms and trains a network of proxy militias throughout the Middle East, the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” with the stated goal of destroying Israel.
These militias include Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, die Houthis in Yemen and militia groups in Syria and Iraq.
Analysts describe a gradual transformation of the Islamic Republic into a kleptocratic military dictatorship
Today, the Revolutionary Guards are numerically inferior to the regular armed forces, but they have more modern weapons and significantly more financial resources. For comparison: While the army with over 400,000 active soldiers had a budget of only 8 billion US dollars in 2022, the Revolutionary Guards with around 150,000 members had around 22 billion at their disposal – almost three times as much.
Violence is profitable
However, these privileges do not come from nowhere. They are closely linked to a decades-long history of suppressing protest movements against the mullahs’ regime. They did consolidate their position within the new system as early as 1980, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. But they only reached the peak of power when they had to defend the Islamic Republic not only against external but also against internal enemies.
Whether in the student protests in 1999, the so-called “green movement” in 2009 or the massive protests in 2019 and 2022: With their own secret service and their partly strongly ideological volunteer militia, called “Basij”, the Revolutionary Guards persecute dissidents with relentless severity. In Iran itself, the Revolutionary Guards are therefore largely unpopular – or even deeply hated.
In terms of foreign policy, the Revolutionary Guards have recently lost much of their threat
But the willingness to use violence is not just ideologically motivated. It is also highly profitable.
In order to enjoy the protection of the Revolutionary Guards, the ruling clerics had to enter into an unspoken devil’s pact with them: in return, the paramilitaries received funding and privileges that became more extensive with each suppressed protest movement. Today they are allowed to conduct illegal trade, receive lucrative government contracts – and generally pay neither taxes nor customs duties.
Is the coup coming?
Well-known people have been describing this since the 10s Iran analysts like Karim Sajadpour a gradual transformation of the Islamic Republic into a kleptocratic military dictatorship. Some observers even see the scenario of an official takeover of power – possibly through a coup – after the death of 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as likely. A democratic Iran would then be prevented until further notice.
The demonstrators are calling for his downfall: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Here at a protest in London on January 11th
Photo:
Isabel Infantes/reuters
In this scenario, however, it remains questionable where the paramilitaries will obtain the religious legitimacy that the remaining supporters of the Islamic Republic demand.
And that is exactly the dilemma the Revolutionary Guards find themselves in today: in order to govern the country more efficiently and appease the anger of the population, they would have to get rid of the incompetent clerical leadership. But at the same time they are dependent on the support of a hard core of Shiite radical supporters of the mullahs’ theocracy – probably 15 percent of the Iranian population.
What remains after the military humiliations?
In terms of foreign policy, the Revolutionary Guards have lost much of their threat following the fall of Assad and the humiliation of Hezbollah. Its reputation, including among regime members, was severely tarnished during the 12-Day War by the destruction of nuclear facilities and the inability to defend Iranian airspace.
The EU would now have the opportunity to further limit its influence by listing it as a terrorist organization. Such a move would undermine the Revolutionary Guard as a diplomatic contact – and thus make a potential takeover of power in the country even more difficult.
Only at home do the Revolutionary Guards still orchestrate a highly efficient police state and remain inextricably linked to the Iranian economy. But as long as their influence – however extensive it is – is tied to the fate of the wavering mullahs’ rule, the position of the Revolutionary Guards remains fragile.
They know that if the mullahs are overthrown they could lose everything, possibly even their lives. The extent of the violence with which they act against their own people has long had something existential: “Either we kill them or they kill us.”